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RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2168  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1556  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
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SUBJECT: OCTOBER 25 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING OUTREACH TALKS IN  
BISHKEK

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11. (U) SUMMARY. On October 25, 2006, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Delegation met a Kyrgyz Republic delegation representing eight agencies and ministries to continue the discussions begun in May 2006 on improving the Kyrgyz Republic's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling. The two delegations reached provisional agreement on two documents ) a joint understanding of the priority needs to improve the Kyrgyz Republic's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling, and a list of possible projects to address those needs. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated it would need two-to-three months to get final government approval for the documents. Once these documents are approved, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach delegation will begin seeking international donors for the projects on the list, and the GOKG will begin implementing those steps in the priority needs document that it can implement without outside assistance.

12. (U) OUTLINE OF MEETING. The U.S. side began by laying out its expectations for the meeting and highlighting some of the strengths in the Kyrgyz Republic's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling. The delegations reviewed the priority needs document, made several revisions, and reached provisional agreement on the text of this document. See para 5 for the provisionally agreed joint document. The two delegations also reached general consensus on the content of the projects list. The U.S. side noted it was not necessary to reach agreement on the text of this document as it would make the changes discussed during the meeting to the project list as it was fleshing it out into 1-page fact sheets for use with international donors. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated it would vet the project list throughout its relevant agencies and ministries and let the U.S. side know if it believed any significant changes were needed. The un-amended version of the project list can be found in para 6 with the changes to be made noted in para 7. Full delegation lists of both sides can be found in para 8.

13. (SBU) RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS AND REVISIONS TO THE PRIORITY NEEDS DOCUMENT. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation concurred with the draft document with a few clarifications and revisions:

--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation accepted a U.S. suggestion to include a list of the ministries and agencies responsible for the area described in each bullet point in the priority needs document and agreed to add this information to the document during its interagency review process.

--The U.S. side agreed to designate a single point of contact at the U.S. Embassy for future correspondence between the GOKG and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach team.

--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated that the Border Guard Service has responsibility for control of the border points of entry (POEs) and the green border areas between these POEs and has a unified approach to control of both areas.

--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated it was working on a law to criminalize nuclear smuggling scams in which a smuggler represents non-radioactive material as dangerous nuclear or radioactive material. In response to a Kyrgyzstani question on U.S. experience in prosecuting such scams, the U.S. side provided excerpts from the U.S. report on compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 highlighting some of the legal authorities the U.S. uses to prosecute WMD smuggling and promised to provide additional information on U.S. authorities for prosecuting hoaxes and scams.

--In response to questions the Kyrgyz Republic delegation posed in the previous meeting in May, the Department of

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Homeland Security's Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) put together a presentation on nuclear smuggling trends and common concealment mechanisms, which the U.S. delegation passed to the Kyrgyz Republic delegation. At the request of NAP, the U.S. delegation indicated that additional briefings may be arranged and asked the Kyrgyz Republic delegation if it would be interested in future meetings of nuclear smuggling experts to share knowledge on smuggling trends in the region. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation expressed appreciation for the presentation and indicated it wanted to review the request for follow-up expert exchanges among the relevant ministries before replying to the U.S. proposal.

--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated that corruption was a significant problem, and argued that the discussion on solutions should focus not only on customs officials and border guards. The U.S. side concurred with this approach.

14. (U) NEXT STEPS. The sides agreed on the following next steps:

a. The U.S. side will incorporate the agreed changes into the priority needs document and provide new copies in English and Russian.

b. The GOKG will review the priority needs and projects documents and seek to reach final approval of these documents in two-to-three months.

c. The sides will resolve any remaining issues and sign the priority needs document.

d. The U.S. side will flesh out the project list into 1-page fact sheets for use with international donors, incorporating changes suggested during this meeting and after the Kyrgyz Republic's interagency review.

e. Once the priority needs document and the fact sheets are finalized, the U.S. side will begin seeking international

donors for the agreed priority projects, while the Kyrgyz Republic side will begin implementing those steps in the priority needs document it can do without outside assistance.

Both sides will keep each other regularly informed of their progress.

15. (SBU) Begin Joint Document on Priority Needs as Provisionally Agreed:

Joint Document of U.S. and Kyrgyz Republic Delegations on the Kyrgyz Republic's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling  
October 25, 2006

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America and the Kyrgyz Republic met in Bishkek on October 25, 2006, to continue their discussions on the capabilities of the Kyrgyz Republic to combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. As a result of these discussions, the delegations reached agreement on the following set of priority needs that should be addressed to most effectively improve the Kyrgyz Republic's anti-smuggling capabilities.

PREVENTION

Accounting and Control of Radioactive Sources

Continue Existing Efforts:

--Work with the IAEA to complete the registry of radioactive sources in accordance with IAEA standards. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Implement the Action Plan for improving control of radioactive sources developed in coordination with the IAEA. (Relevant Agencies: )

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--Work with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to identify facilities and locations at a high risk for the presence of orphaned radioactive source materials, search these facilities, and secure any radioactive sources no longer in use. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Sustain physical security improvements at the National Radioactive Waste Repository and the National Center of Oncology made through the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) International Radiological Threat Reduction Program. (Relevant Agencies: )

Additional Efforts Needed:

--Work with U.S. and other international partners to identify any facilities with vulnerable high-activity radioactive sources still in use, improve security at any identified facilities, and provide training to appropriate staff of relevant ministries and agencies, in particular trainers. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Participate in the IAEA Model Project. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Strengthen the ministries and agencies responsible for drafting and enforcing nuclear-related laws and regulations by providing additional resources and personnel. (Relevant Agencies: )

DETECTION

Export Control and Border Security

Continue Existing Efforts:

--Work with the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program to provide additional training for export control officials and Customs officers at points of entry to effectively implement recent improvements in the Kyrgyz Republic's export control laws. A key focus of the provided training will be on the busiest border crossing points where EXBS is conducting refurbishing projects and providing various inspection and detection equipment. Additional training for the Kyrgyz Customs Service will include an Export Enforcement Workshop that will build on previously delivered training on the enforcement of export

controls and nonproliferation. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Incorporate WMD detection and interdiction training from the EXBS program into the standard training curriculum for the Department of Customs Service and the Border Guard. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Work with the EXBS Advisor and DOE's Second Line of Defense (SLD) Kyrgyz Republic Country Manager to prioritize locations for additional equipment for detecting illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and enforcing border controls. (Relevant Agencies: )

Additional Efforts Needed:  
--Conclude the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. government regarding the Department of Energy SLD program. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Deploy additional radiation detection and basic inspection equipment and conduct related training at airports and border crossings. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Enhance monitoring of green border areas between established points of entry through strengthened patrolling and additional technical equipment. (Relevant Agencies: )

## RESPONSE

### Prosecution

Continue Existing Efforts:  
--Arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers to the full extent of the law. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Continue efforts to revise the legal code to punish nuclear smuggling scams when individuals try to sell non-radioactive materials while claiming these are dangerous nuclear or radioactive materials. (Relevant Agencies: )

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Additional Efforts Needed:  
--Review sentences for illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials to ensure they are adequate to deter such crimes. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Commit to follow the IAEA Model Action Plan for Nuclear Forensics contained in the new IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006). (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Further develop the Kyrgyz Republic's nuclear forensics capabilities through consistent participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG). (Relevant Agencies: )

### International Cooperation and Information Sharing

Continue Existing Efforts:  
--Conduct a mutual exchange of information with the U.S. on nuclear smuggling trends and share experience combating such smuggling. (Relevant Agencies: )

Additional Efforts Needed:  
--Improve reporting to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Announce smuggling convictions in the press. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Share aggregate smuggling data with the U.S., including the total number of smuggling cases detected, the number of arrests, and the number of suspects convicted and jailed. (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. (Relevant Agencies: )

## CORRUPTION

Continue Existing Efforts:  
--Implement the October 2005 edict "On Urgent Measures to Fight Against Corruption." (Relevant Agencies: )  
--Investigate and prosecute cases of corruption identified by the responsible ministries and agencies. (Relevant Agencies: )

Additional Efforts Needed:

--Develop specific plans to combat potential corruption among customs officials and border guards, possibly including:

(Relevant Agencies: )

-Incorporation of anti-corruption/integrity awareness training into the standard curriculum for all customs officials and border guards.

-Coordination with the SLD Country Manager during installation of radiation monitors to identify resources and needs for future communications links and sustained training to enhance effective response and mitigate opportunities for corruption.

-Increased pay for customs officials and border guards.

--Develop plans to combat potential corruption among other ministries and agencies.

(Signature block)

End Priority Needs Document.

#### 16. (SBU) Begin Un-Amended Projects List:

Possible Assistance Projects to Address the Kyrgyz Republic's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

#### PREVENTION

Improving Control and Accounting of Radioactive Materials  
Need:

The Kyrgyz Republic is currently working with the IAEA to develop a registry of radioactive sources and to revise its regulatory laws and regulations to improve control of these

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sources. These efforts have been slowed by limited resources and a shortage of trained personnel. Until these efforts are completed, radioactive sources in the Kyrgyz Republic remain vulnerable to theft and illicit trafficking.

Possible Project:

A prospective donor could provide support for temporary personnel to help compile the registry of radioactive sources and to review current laws and make any needed revisions to bring these in line with IAEA standards. A prospective donor should work closely with the IAEA on this project, as the IAEA has done several assessment missions and worked with the Kyrgyz Republic to develop an Action Plan for improving control of radioactive sources. Outside technical expertise would be useful in implementing this Action Plan. Additionally, a prospective donor could encourage the Kyrgyz Republic to add permanent regulatory personnel by agreeing to provide training, computers, and inspection equipment for these new personnel.

Improving Physical Security at Sites with Dangerous Radioactive Materials

Need:

The U.S. Department of Energy identified two facilities in the Kyrgyz Republic with high-activity radioactive sources, and completed physical security upgrades at these facilities.

Because the Kyrgyz Republic lacks a comprehensive registry of radioactive sources, additional facilities with high-activity radioactive sources may exist, which are vulnerable to theft and illicit trafficking.

Possible Project:

A prospective donor could provide support to conduct additional inspections of facilities likely to have high-activity radioactive sources. If these searches revealed any facilities with vulnerable radioactive sources still in use, a donor could fund physical security upgrades at these facilities. These security upgrades would likely include hardened doors and locks, cameras, alarm systems, motion sensors, and internal radiation monitors.

#### DETECTION

## Improving Border Security at Points of Entry

### Need:

The Kyrgyz Republic's international points of entry (POEs) do not have adequate radiation detection equipment, and its personnel do not have adequate training, to effectively detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Some remote outposts lack basic equipment and cold weather gear.

### Possible Project:

A prospective donor could provide additional equipment and training to equip Customs officials at airports and border crossings. To effectively detect nuclear and radioactive materials, a typical border checkpoint should be equipped with one or more stationary radiation portal monitors, handheld radiation detection equipment for secondary inspections, and related communications equipment and training. Portal monitors should be linked to a central alarm station to connect border personnel to technical experts if needed and to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Some remote outposts need basic inspection tools and cold weather gear. The donor should work with the Kyrgyz government, particularly the State Customs Service, and the U.S. government to determine specific equipment needs and priority sites and ensure compatibility with existing equipment. Donors should also provide training on use and maintenance of the equipment and appropriate alarm response procedures.

## Improving Border Security at Green Borders

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### Need:

Green borders, those areas between established points of entry, have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. The Border Service has responsibility for monitoring the border, but suffers from lack of equipment and training. The high elevation, rough terrain, and often harsh weather make many of these green border areas difficult to adequately patrol. These vulnerabilities have been exploited by drug smugglers and terrorists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the past. The borders with Tajikistan and China are a particular concern.

### Possible Project:

A donor could provide additional vehicles, communications equipment, portable radiation detection equipment, remote sensing equipment, and training to help the Border Service better patrol these areas to prevent and detect smuggling. Snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) are needed in areas without adequate roads. In some areas, horse patrols provide a more cost-effective option. The State Department Aviation/Interdiction Project is providing aircraft and related support, but more such aircraft are needed. In areas with poor or nonexistent roads, small aircraft patrolling the border areas and working with Border Service personnel on the ground can dramatically improve awareness of what is crossing the borders and force traffic toward established border crossings where detection of nuclear smuggling or other contraband would be more likely.

## RESPONSE

## Sponsoring International Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics

### Need:

The international nuclear forensics and attribution community benefits from broad international participation. The International Technical Working Group (ITWG) meets yearly, encourages forensic scientists and law enforcement bodies to participate, and conducts nuclear forensic exercises using actual material. Kyrgyzstani officials have not previously participated in the ITWG. Such participation would help Kyrgyzstani scientists develop relationships with the international forensics community and increase their forensic

and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown origin. Wider participation also increases the international knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution during forensics testing of seized material. Participation in the ITWG and international exercises can also help Kyrgyzstani technical experts develop procedures in line with the IAEA Model Action Plan on Nuclear Forensics.

#### Possible Project:

If resources are the primary issue regarding non-participation, we envision that a donor country or the IAEA could sponsor the time and travel for several Kyrgyzstani scientists and/or law enforcement personnel to participate in ITWG activities for the upcoming year. This would include attendance at the next ITWG annual meeting, participation in the annual Exercise, and participation in ITWG working groups for one year. Based on U.S. experience, this effort would cost approximately USD50K for one year.

#### CORRUPTION

##### Need:

As in many parts of the world, corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic remains a serious problem, which could undermine Kyrgyzstani and international efforts to improve capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling. The potential for corruption among Customs officials and border guards is a particular concern, since bribes could be paid to entice officials to overlook smuggling or to enable smugglers to avoid radiation

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detection equipment. In addition to facilitating smuggling, corruption often reduces the revenue collected by the Customs officials, which could be used for higher salaries for Customs officials or general improvements in border security.

##### Possible Project:

Projects to address potential corruption among Customs officials and border guards could include incorporation of anti-corruption/integrity awareness training into the standard curriculum for these agencies, help in developing standardized risk analysis models for determining what is searched, automatic monitoring technologies, like radiation monitors that report alarms to headquarters, and increased pay for border security personnel. It would be particularly useful for a donor to help the Kyrgyz Republic integrate various anti-corruption efforts and develop a comprehensive plan to address corruption among Customs officials and border guards.

End Project List.

#### 17. (SBU) REVISIONS TO BE MADE TO THE LIST OF PROJECTS.

Based on the discussion, the U.S. side indicated it would make several revisions to the projects as it fleshed them out into 1-page fact sheets for outreach to international donors.

These include indicating the possibility that donor support could address the personnel shortage in the Kyrgyz Republic's nuclear regulatory agencies, and that border security enforcement training at points of entry could be expanded to include border guards in addition to Customs officers. The U.S. side also agreed to expand the scope of the corruption project to address corruption beyond the Customs service and border guards. The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach team will also make a clarification to the border security project at points of entry, noting that donors interested in providing portal monitors in the Kyrgyz Republic will be encouraged to work through the Second Line of Defense Program or provide complementary equipment to what DOE is providing, such as inspection kits and cold weather gear. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated that it will review the project list as part of its interagency approval process, and forward any significant changes in the parameters, scope, or number of priority projects to the U.S. side for its review.

18. (U) DELEGATION LISTS.

U.S. Delegation:

Michael Stafford, Head of Delegation, Department of State  
Brent Eastman, Department of State  
Brendan Plapp, Department of State  
Pat Connors, Department of State  
Michelle Habegger, Department of State  
Erin Mark, Department of Energy

Kyrgyz Republic Delegation:

Dinara Zaripova, Head of Delegation, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
Argen Toktogylov, Border Service  
Aibek Dyisheyev, Ministry of Justice  
Zhildiy Dyisheyeva, Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism  
Taalaybek Bektashev, Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism  
Sapar Asanaliev, Ministry of Internal Affairs  
Zhanyshbek Toroev, Ministry of Defense  
Dastan Ulanbek, Ministry of Emergency Situations  
Kubanychbek Kulmatov, State Customs Service  
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